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Kentucky's New Nuisance Statute
JOHN S. PALMORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1991 special session the General Assembly of
Kentucky enacted as a part of Kentucky Revised Statutes [here-
inafter KRS] chapter 411 "AN ACT relating to nuisances" (the
Act).' The bill was signed by the Governor and became effective
on May 24, 1991. Its stated purpose is to codify the common
law relating to nuisance without abridging "any other rights or
remedies available for personal or property damage .... -2 In
that it makes no reference to public nuisance and the term
"private nuisance" appears frequently throughout the statute,3
it is clear that the Act deals exclusively with the law of private
nuisance vis-a-vis nuisance in general. As it expressly disclaims
any change in existing law, 4 existing case precedents will continue
to occupy an important role in the litigation of nuisance cases,
especially if it should be contended that in some relevant respect
the statute does not accurately reflect the case law prevailing at
the time of its enactment. The purpose of this article is to
examine the statute in terms of existing case law.
II. DEF NoNs
Essentially, KRS 411.530(2) and 411.540(2) define a private
nuisance as any use of property (defined in KRS 411.510(7) as
"real property") that "causes unreasonable and substantial an-
noyance to the occupants of [other] property or unreasonably
* John S. Palmore is senior counsel to the firm of Jackson & Kelly in Lexington,
Kentucky. He was admitted to the bar in 1938 and practiced law in Henderson, Kentucky,
until elected to the Court of Appeals (now Supreme Court) of Kentucky in 1959. He
retired from the Supreme Court in January of 1983 after having served as its Chief
Justice from 1977 to 1982.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.500 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1991) (hereinafter KRS].
2 KRS §§ 411.500, 411.570.
KRS §§ 411.510(1), (5); 411.520(1), (2); 411.530(1); 411.540(1); 411.550(1);
411.560(l), (3)-(5).
4 KRS § 411.500.
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interferes with [their] use and enjoyment of [it]. . .".. In the
instance of a permanent nuisance, it must result in a "material"
reduction in the fair market value of the claimant's property,'
and for a temporary nuisance it must cause a reduction in the
value of the use or the rental value of the affected property.
6
These definitions are in keeping with case law as exemplified
by Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd and numerous other deci-
sions. Though negligence on the defendant's part may be an
important factor in weighing the reasonableness of his conduct,
it is not essential to a cause of action against him.' "The focus
is on reasonableness as against unreasonableness, possible neg-
ligence being no more than an element entering into a resolution
of that question." 9 In short, the basic question is whether under
all of the circumstances the damage inflicted on the claimant's
property interest by reason of the defendant's use of his own
property is unreasonable.
11. Disrm cnoN BETWEEN PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY
NuiSANCES
KRS 411.530(1) defines as permanent "any private nuisance
that: (a) [clannot be corrected or abated at reasonable expense
to the owner; and (b) [ius relatively enduring and not likely to
be abated voluntarily or by court order." Any nuisance that is
not permanent according to this definition is a temporary nui-
sance. 10
Whether a structure or condition is permanent "is decided
by determining whether it can be readily corrected or abated at
a reasonable expense; if it can, it is temporary; if it cannot, it
is permanent." I
If it be permanent, usually it is necessary that it be created by
the inherent character of the structure or business, and that its
lawful and necessary operation creates a permanent injury; but
where the structure or the business when properly conducted
KRS § 411.530(2).
6 KRS § 411.540(2).
339 S.W.2d 181, 186-87 (Ky. 1960).
Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Ky. 1965); Louisville and
Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky. 1965).
George v. Standard Slag Co., 431 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Ky. 1968).
-0 KRS § 411.540(1).
- City of Ashland v. Kittle, 305 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Ky. 1957).
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and operated does not constitute a nuisance and only becomes
such through negligence, it is temporary. If the structure is in
character relatively enduring and not likely to be abated, either
voluntarily or by an order of court, it is generally held that
the nuisance is a permanent one .... 12
In determining whether a nuisance is permanent or tempo-
rary, "the question is to examine whether the cause of the
nuisance results from some improper installation or method of
operation which can be remedied at reasonable expense. If so,
the nuisance is a temporary one.""
One test of whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent is
whether the cause of the nuisance can be readily corrected or
abated at a reasonable expense .... But another test is whether
the offending structure will be 'relatively enduring and not
likely to be abated, either voluntarily or by an order of court."1
4
Clearly, the statutory definitions of permanent and tempo-
rary nuisances are in conformity with the case law.
When the facts are not in dispute, whether an alleged nui-
sance is permanent or temporary is an issue of law for the trial
court to decide; otherwise, it is a jury question."
IV. FACTORS DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF REASONABLENESS
KRS 411.550(1) provides that in "determining whether a
defendant's use of his property constitutes a nuisance" the fact-
finder (in a suit for damages, the jury, or in an injunction suit,
the judge) "shall consider all relevant facts and circumstances,"
including the following:
(a) The lawful nature of the defendant's use of his property;
(b) The manner in which the defendant has used it;
(c) The importance of the defendant's use of the property to
the community;
(d) The influence of [his] use of property on the growth and
prosperity of the community;
,1 Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d I, 4-5 (Ky. 1936) (citations
omitted).
Lynn Mining Co., 394 S.W.2d at 759 (emphasis added).
Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ky. 1974) (citations
omitted).
1 Lynn Mining Co., 394 S.W.2d at 759.
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(e) The kind, volume and duration of the annoyance or inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of claimant's property;
(f) The respective situations of the defendant and claimant;
and
(g) The character of the area in which the defendant's property
is located, including, but not limited to, all applicable statutes,
laws or regulations.'6
These factors are taken almost verbatim from Louisville
Refining Company'7 and George v. Standard Slag Co. ' 8
V. ALLOWABLE DAMAGES
A. Real Property
The allowable damages in a private nuisance suit are (1) for
a permanent nuisance, the resulting loss in market value of the
claimant's property,' 9 and (2) for a temporary nuisance, the
resulting diminution in the value of the use of the claimant's
property if it was occupied by the claimant or, if it was not so
occupied, the resulting diminution in its fair rental value during
the time the nuisance existed within the period of limitations.20
The measures of recoverable property damage thus
, KRS § 411,550(t)(a)-(g).
" Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Ky. 1960).
George, 431 S.W.2d at 715.
" Permanent nuisance: Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659,
664 (Ky. 1974); George v. Standard Slag Co., 431 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. 1968); Kentucky-
West Virginia Gas Co. v. Mamy, 279 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Ky. 1955); Searcy v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 267 S.W.2d 71, 72-73 (Ky. 1954); Brumley v. Mary Gail Coal Co., 246
S.W.2d 148, 151 (Ky. 1952); Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ky.
1936); City of Madisonville v. Hardman, 92 S.W. 930, 931 (Ky. 1906).
Temporary nuisance: Nally & Gibson v. Mulholland, 399 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ky.
1966); Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Ky. 1965); Adams Constr. Co.
v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Ky. 1960); City of Frankfort v. Ballew, 151 S.W.2d
1063, 1065 (Ky. 1941); City of Hazard v. Eversole, 133 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Ky. 1939);
Standard Oil Co. v. Bentley, 84 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Ky. 1935); City of Madisonville v.
Nisbit, 39 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Ky. 1931); Gay v. Perry, 265 S.W. 437, 438 (Ky. 1924);
Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 255 S.W. 1048 (Ky. 1923); Southern Ry. Co. v.
Routh, 170 S.W. 520, 521 (Ky. 1914). But see Radcliff Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, 766
S.W.2d 63, 66-67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), for an intermediate appellate court opinion that
deviates from earlier decisions by Kentucky's highest court on the measure of damages
and relies to some extent on a federal case, Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Lafferty,
174 F.2d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 1949), which was later characterized in Matny, 279 S.W.2d
at 807, as "not binding on us" and "in conflict with our cases."
-1 KRS § 411.560(I)(a).
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set forth in KRS 411.560 accurately reflect long and well-estab-
lished case law as reflected by the opinions of Kentucky's highest
court.21
B. Personal Property
Under the old traditional principles governing the law of
private nuisances one would not ordinarily contemplate damage
to personal property, and the Act makes no provision for it.
However, in Klutey v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways,u
the court extended the principles of nuisance law to surface-
water cases, 2 and in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Baird,2' recovery was allowed under nuisance principles for dam-
age to personalty through the flooding of an upholstery shop.2
C. Personal Injury
KRS 411.560(3) specifically prohibits any award "for annoy-
ance, discomfort, sickness, emotional distress, or similar claims."
It further provides that if a claim for personal injury or damage
is asserted in the same proceeding, it must be resolved on the
basis of applicable tort principles independently of whether a
nuisance is found to exist.23 This is in keeping with the funda-
mental premise that the gravamen of a nuisance is damage to
property rather than persons. Otherwise, the factors that are
required for consideration in determining the existence of nui-
sance would be largely inappropriate.
The opinions of the Kentucky courts over the years reflect
considerable inconsistency with respect to the role of personal
annoyance or injury in nuisance cases. In the early case of
Kemper v. City of Louisville,27 the opinion directing a new trial
concludes with this admonition:
[T]he appellants are entitled to recover for the injury to the
lot by reason of the construction of the fill, and while no
" KRS § 411.560(i)(b).
428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967).
id. at 769. See also Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659,
663 (Ky. 1974).
" 444 S.W.2d. 541 (Ky. 1969).
Id. at 543.
- KRS § 411.560(3).
"77 Ky. (14 Bush) 87 (Ky. 1878).
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recovery can be had for physicians' bills paid, or the loss of
time on the part of the occupants on account of sickness caused
by the stagnant water, etc., still these facts may be proven
with a view of showing the extent to which the value of the
property has been lessened. This is the actual damage sus-
tained.2
A generation later, in City of Madisonville v. Hardman," with-
out referring to any previous authority on the subject, the
court had this to say:
In an action such as this, a recovery may be had where the
evidence justifies it for sickness, disease, annoyance, discom-
fort, and injuries to property. In fact, every injury to person
and property that the person complaining has sustained by
reason of the nuisance may be recovered in one action."
The court dealt with the subject more at length in Gay v.
Perry12 citing and expressly following the old rule of Kemper"
and quoting from Southern Ry. Co. v. Routh,34 as follows:
When it comes to measuring the damages, the diminution in
the value of the use of the property necessarily includes an-
noyance and discomfort, which directly affect the value of the
use. It is not, therefore, proper to permit a recovery both for
the diminution in the value of the use and for annoyance and
discomfort, which necessarily enter into and constitute a part
of the diminution of such value.
35
This is the rule to which Kentucky's highest court has con-
sistently adhered ever since Southern Ry. Co. was decided in
n Id. at 96.
2 92 S.W. 930 (Ky. 1906).
"However, in Mahan v. Doggett, 84 S.W. 525, 526 (Ky. 1905), a sawdust case,
the court had said the plaintiff was entitled "to recover for the discomforts suffered by
him and his family, in addition to the actual damage done to his property, or he was
entitled to recover for such discomforts even though his property sustained no actual
damage." (Emphasis added).
11 City of Madisonville v. Hardman, 92 S.W. at 931.
12 265 S.W. 437 (Ky. 1924).
" 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 87 (Ky. 1878).
170 S.W. 520 (Ky. 1914).
Gay, 265 S.W. at 438. In Southern Ry. Co., 170 S.W. at 521, a judgment for
the plaintiff was reversed because the instructions authorized recovery for "annoyance
and discomfort to her (plaintiffs) family" in addition to diminution in value of the use
of the property.
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1914,316 subject only to a possible aberration in City of Pres-
tonsburg v. Lafferty.17 In 1949, however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, undertaking to analyze the law
of Kentucky, construed Gay v. Perry8 as having recognized
"that in given cases, involving a nuisance, there may be, in
Kentucky, a recovery for injury to a person's health and a
recovery for injury to his property, in the same action. . . ..9
Although this federal court opinion has been cited in at least
two Kentucky opinions of fairly recent vintage, 40 when the same
question came before the Kentucky court in a case involving the
same defendant and the same nuisance condition, the response
was as follows:
It is plaintiffs' contention that while a party may not recover
both types of damages, he may recover for annoyance and
discomfort independently if other damages are not sought or
have not theretofore been recovered. We are cited to no Ken-
tucky authority so adjudging.
Reference is made to Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v.
Lafferty . . .wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals... intimated in its opinion that a separate suit for an-
noyance and discomfort might be maintained under Kentucky
law. It does not appear that question was squarely presented
in the case, and the possible remedies suggested in the opinion
are not binding on us and appear to be in direct conflict with
our cases above cited. . . .4
In Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Company v. Charles, 42 the court
concluded with this comment on the subject of injury to the
person:
' See e.g., Kendand-Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d at 664; George, 431 S.W.2d
at 716; Matny, 279 S.W.2d at 807; Searcy, 267 S.W.2d at 72; City of Hazard, 133
S.W.2d at 909; Kentucky Ohio Gas Co., 95 S.W.2d at 5.
11 291 S.W. 1030 (Ky. 1927). In City of Prestonsburg v. Lqfferty a judgment for
the plaintiffs was reversed because of errors both in the admission of evidence and in
the instructions. Without any reference to prior opinions, and apparently without much
thought on the specific point, the opinion concludes with directions that on another trial
"the instructions should confine the plaintiffs' right of recovery to damages to their
peace and comfort in the occupancy of their homes, and should not be so broad or
general as to include damage to their health unless the competent evidence authorizes
it." Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
" 265 S.W. 437.
Lafferty, 174 F.2d at 852.
Southeast Coal Co. v. Combs, 760 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1988); Radcliff Homes,
Inc., 766 S.W.2d at 67.
4 Matny, 279 S.W.2d at 807.
42 Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d 659.
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The instructions should not authorize any recovery for personal
annoyance, discomfort or sickness of the plaintiffs, because
there was no claim of damages for personal injury. On a
nuisance suit, such as this, while evidence of those elements is
admissible as affecting the value of the use of the property,
they are necessarily included in the damages for diminution in
the value of the use and are not distinct elements of damage.
See Gay v. Perry, 205 Ky. 38, 265 S.W. 437; City of Hazard
v. Eversole, 280 Ky. 621, 133 S.W.2d 906.4
3
The opinion from which this excerpt is taken was written
for the court by Commissioner Robert Cullen, not one to use
words loosely. This passage seems only consistent with the theory
that although a claim for personal injury may exist, it cannot
be allowed on the basis of nuisance. In other words, the claim
for personal injury should be stated separately from the nuisance
claim, and must rest upon a legal theory other than nuisance.
KRS 411.560(3) reflects this principle. " Logically, personal in-
jury simply falls outside the scope of nuisance law.
Insofar as nuisances are unpleasant or offensive and thereby
diminish the enjoyment of life, the sights, sounds, and smells
that ordinarily suffice to establish their existence would not result
in personal injuries. However, damage to one's health is another
matter. Perhaps some of the confusion has resulted from the
failure of the courts through the years to consider the difference
between mere discomfort and annoyance, on the one hand, and
physical illness on the other. In Kemper v. City of Louisville, 4
for example, the court held that there could be no recovery "for
physicians' bills paid, or the loss of time on the part of the
occupants on account of sickness. . . ."4 Again, in Gay v.
Perry,4 7 it was held that "the court erred in authorizing a recov-
ery for personal sickness. . .. "48 The words "annoyance, dis-
I d. at 664.
KRS § 411.560(3) states in part: "In the event a claim for injury or damage to
a person is asserted in the same proceeding as a claim for damage to the claimant's
property caused by a private nuisance, liability for such personal injury or damage shall
be determined on the basis of applicable principles of tort law."
41 Kemper, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 87.
" Id. at 96.
4' Gay, 265 S.W. 437.
" Id. at 438. This case, upon which the Sixth Circuit in Kentucky West Virginia
Gas Co. v. Lafferty, 174 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1949), relied as supporting the
proposition that recovery may be had in the same action for both property damage and
injury to a person's health, actually followed Kemper v. City of Louisville in classifying
"personal sickness" as a species of "annoyance and discomfort."
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comfort, and illness" are lumped together in City of Hazard v.
Eversole.49 In Searcy v. Kentucky Utilities Co. 0 and Kentucky
West Virginia Gas Company v. Matny,5 the expression is "an-
noyance and discomfort." And again in Kentland-Elkhorn Coal
Company v. Charles it is "annoyance, discomfort or sickness.' ' 2
It seems certain to the writer of this article that the Supreme
Court of Kentucky as presently constituted would view an illness
as equivalent to a physical injury. If a bodily infirmity can be
traced to an external source, it should make no difference whether
it is "traumatic." Assuming that the illness is real and substan-
tial, and is proved to have been caused by the same conduct or
condition alleged to have created a nuisance with respect to the
plaintiff's property, the important question is, what must be
proved in order to establish a cause of action? In other words,
what is the tort? Is it negligence, or is it some type of activity
for which there is liability without fault? In either event, it
should make no difference whether the plaintiff was or was not
an occupant of the property damaged by the nuisance. A pas-
serby on the public sidewalk made ill by some noxious substance
emanating from the defendant's factory or laboratory would be
just as wronged as a similarly-affected occupant of an adjacent
dwelling.
It is not this writer's purpose to suggest answers to these
questions, but only to point out that the practitioner who intends
to assert a claim for personal injury or illness in the context of
a nuisance action must be prepared with jury instructions prem-
ising recovery on elements of proof that are essential to a cause
of action other than nuisance. It is a subject that has lurked
beneath the surface of our nuisance cases for more than a
century, but thus far has never been satisfactorily discussed in
any opinion by the courts of Kentucky. 3 This much is certain:
the factors prescribed by KRS 411.550(1) to be considered in
determining the existence of a nuisance, vel non, would not be
appropriate to a personal injury or wrongful death claim.1
4
Eversole, -133 S.W.2d at 909.
Searcy, 267 S.W.2d at 72.
Matny, 279 S.W.2d at 807.
' Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d at 664.
"In Kentucky West Virginia Gas Company v. Matny, 279 S.W.2d at 805, however,
the court observed that if it were assumed that an independent action would lie for
annoyance and discomfort. KRS 413.140, the one-year statute of limitations on personal
injury claims, would apply.
' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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This phase of our discussion would not be complete without
mention of Radcliff Homes, Inc. v. Jackson."5 In Radcliff Homes,
a panel of the present Kentucky Court of Appeals, apparently
oblivious to the latest precedents of the old Court of Appeals
(now Kentucky Supreme Court) in Kentucky West Virginia Gas
Company v. Matny and in Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Company
v. Charles,7 proceeded to quote and follow the federal court
opinion in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Company v. Lafferty.58
The Lafferty opinion had already, in substance, been expressly
repudiated and was contrary to the law as stated in these two
later state-court cases.A9 Also, contrary to all previous Kentucky
authority, the Radcliff Homes opinion approved a special meas-
ure of damages for a temporary nuisance. 60
Radcliff Homes failed to follow decisions of two previous
cases of the highest court in Kentucky. Rule 1.030(8)(a) of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky provides as follows:
"The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable
precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and
its predecessor court. ' 6 1 To the extent that the Radcliff Homes
opinion deviates from the specific holdings of the controlling
precedents, it is the writer's opinion that it cannot be regarded
as a part of the common law of the state.
VI. PARTIAL CAUSATION
KRS 411.560(2) provides that one who contributes to a nui-
sance shall be liable only to the extent of his proportionate
contribution to it, as prescribed by KRS 411.182. This is in
accordance with George v. Standard Slag Company 2 and South-
east Coal Co., Inc. v. Combs.63 As yet unanswered is the ques-
" Radcliff Homes, Inc., 766 S.W.2d 63.
Matny, 279 S.W.2d 807.
17 Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d 664.
Lafferty, 174 F.2d 853.
Radcliff Homes, Inc., 766 S.W.2d at 67.
Id. at 66-67. The opinion further says that in a nuisance case "either strict
liability or negligence may form the basis for liability," citing Louisville and Jeffers n
County Air Board v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965), as supporting authority.
Radcliff Homes, Inc., 766 S.W.2d at 69. This proposition comes to the writer of the
Air Board opinion as a considerable surprise.
6 Ky. Sup. Cr. R. § 1.030(8)(a).
George, 431 S.W.2d at 716.
760 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1988).
[VOL. 7:1
KENTUCKY'S NEw NUISANCE STATUTE
tion of whether a contributing cause that would not in itself
create a nuisance could result in liability. Would it, for example,
have to be a "substantial factor," as in negligence cases?
VII. STANDING To SUE
KRS 411.560(5) provides that "[n]o person shall have stand-
ing to bring an action for private nuisance unless [he] has an
ownership interest or possessory interest in the property alleged
to be affected by the nuisance." The term "possessory interest"
is defined in KRS 411.510(6) as "lawfully possessing property"
but not including "mere occupancy."
Considering the different measures of damages, as discussed
above, it is obvious that legal possession alone would not give
standing to sue or recover for a permanent nuisance.' 4 The
Kentucky courts have not thus far addressed the question of
what constitutes "possession" or "lawful possession" within the
context of nuisance claims.
VIII. STATUTE OF LIMTATIONS
The Act does not prescribe time limitations. According to
settled case law, however, the applicable statute of limitations is
KRS 413.120 (five years). For a permanent nuisance, the period
ordinarily runs from the time the conduct or activity in question
became a substantial annoyance to the claimant.65 A temporary
nuisance, on the other hand, is like a continuing trespass, for
which recovery can be had for so much of the damage as has
accrued during the five-year period immediately preceding the
filing of the action."
IX. CONCLUSION
The 1991 Nuisance Act does not appear to add to or deviate
from existing case law in any material respect. As in the instance
of other codifications, it should make it easier to find the law
and determine what it is.
6 See Brink v. Moeschl Edwards Corrugating Co., 133 S.W. 1147, 1148 (Ky.
1911), holding that plaintiffs who had failed to prove their title could recover for injury
to their possession but not for damage to the fee without such proof. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (1977).
" Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d at 187.
- West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Ky. 1959).
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